Finance

Better, the mortgage lending company, is currently navigating a period of significant executive turnover and strategic financial adjustments. These developments highlight the company's efforts to stabilize its operations and improve its financial health amidst a challenging market.

Better Undergoes Leadership Shake-Up Amidst Financial Re-evaluation

In recent months, Better, a leading entity in the mortgage lending sector, has seen a notable exodus of senior executives. Among those who have transitioned out are Kelly Miskunas, who served as the head of capital markets; Edward Asher, the corporate treasurer; and Hana Khosla, the vice president of finance, all of whom departed in April. Additionally, June witnessed the departure of Mike D'Ambrosio, director of credit risk and head of underwriting, and Dom Savino, who oversaw partnerships and financial products. These changes coincided with Kevin Ryan, Better's Chief Financial Officer, taking on an additional position as a managing director in the capital solutions group at investment banking firm Houlihan Lokey in July. Despite this new role, Ryan remains committed to his duties as CFO at Better. The company stated that these departures were voluntary, with executives pursuing new opportunities.

These leadership adjustments occur as Better works diligently to improve its financial standing. Ryan confirmed the company's focus on cost discipline and its aim to achieve adjusted EBITDA breakeven by the third quarter of 2026, echoing sentiments from CEO Vishal Garg. This strategic direction follows a recent financial maneuver in April, where Better successfully retired $534 million of its outstanding debt due in 2028. This debt restructuring involved a one-time cash payment of $110 million to SB Northstar, SoftBank’s asset management arm, and the issuance of $155 million in new senior secured notes at a 6% annual interest rate, maturing in December 2028. The transaction also granted the investor the right to designate a non-voting board observer. This move is projected to generate approximately $265 million in positive pretax equity value, significantly optimizing the company's liability structure.

In the second quarter of 2025, Better reported a net loss of $36 million, a notable improvement compared to the $50.5 million loss in Q1 2025 and the $41 million loss in the same period last year. While the adjusted EBITDA loss was $27 million, slightly higher than the $23 million a year ago, it was an improvement from the $40 million loss in the previous quarter. These figures underscore the company’s determined efforts towards financial recovery and stability.

From a reporter's perspective, these developments at Better paint a vivid picture of a company in active transformation. The strategic realignment of its executive team, coupled with aggressive financial restructuring, indicates a clear intent to adapt and thrive in a volatile market. The ability to reduce significant debt and incrementally improve financial results, even with high-level departures, suggests a robust underlying strategy. It will be compelling to observe how these internal shifts impact the company's trajectory and its ambitious profitability targets in the coming quarters. This situation highlights the dynamic nature of corporate leadership and financial resilience in the face of economic pressures.

Preserving Competition: The MBA's Vision for the Secondary Mortgage Market

Maintaining Two Robust Entities for Market Stability

The Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) maintains a steadfast position against the merger of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, emphasizing that the existence of at least two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) fosters essential competition within the secondary mortgage market. According to the MBA's chief economist, Mike Fratantoni, a competitive environment is fundamentally beneficial for the entire financial ecosystem. This viewpoint suggests that while both entities offer similar products and uphold stringent credit standards, their independent operations allow for distinct strengths that can better serve the primary market under varying conditions, a crucial advantage that might be lost through consolidation.

Addressing Past Concerns and Modern Safeguards

Critics of maintaining two separate GSEs often cite the period leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, arguing that intense competition spurred excessive risk-taking. However, the MBA counters this by highlighting significant post-crisis reforms, such as the Dodd-Frank Act's provisions on ability-to-repay and Qualified Mortgage rules. These regulatory enhancements, combined with increased fees (from 20 basis points before the crisis to 50 basis points today) reflecting stronger capital standards, have fortified the system. Fratantoni asserts that the mortgage finance system is currently more robust than ever, mitigating the risks perceived two decades ago. Furthermore, the GSEs already collaborate efficiently in areas where competition offers minimal value, such as the Uniform Mortgage-Backed Security (UMBS) and To-Be-Announced (TBA) markets, which collectively enhance secondary market liquidity.

The Nuances of a Stock Offering and Investor Appeal

Reports indicate that the Trump administration is exploring a stock offering for the GSEs, potentially involving a 5% to 15% stake in entities valued around $500 billion. The MBA expresses skepticism about the appeal of such an offering to investors without significant control, given the inherent policy uncertainties. The lack of clarity regarding the future structure of these businesses, their capital framework, and the government's precise role makes an accurate valuation extremely challenging at this juncture. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and FHFA Director Bill Pulte have underscored that any reform's ultimate success will be measured by stable mortgage rates and sustained market liquidity. Yet, the MBA insists on the necessity of an explicit government guarantee.

The Imperative of an Explicit Government Backstop

An explicit government guarantee is deemed crucial by the MBA to ensure stability within the mortgage-backed securities market. Fratantoni argues that assuming investors would react to future crises as they did before 2008, without such a guarantee, constitutes a significant risk. This explicit backstop would provide a clear assurance to investors, preventing potential shifts of business to bank balance sheets, private-label securitization, or the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) if capital requirements or guarantee fees become too burdensome. The MBA also advocates for the inclusion of bank regulators and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in these discussions, underscoring the complexity of the proposed changes. The tight timeframe for implementing a stock issuance by November, while also considering all market impacts and regulatory perspectives, raises concerns for the MBA.

Reimagining FHFA's Role and Ensuring Market Integrity

Beyond the stock offering, the MBA champions an explicit government backstop, the discontinuation of volume-based pricing discounts, and a clear demarcation between the GSEs' secondary market activities and any primary market operations. They envision a transformation of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)'s role, moving away from its conservatorship functions to solely a regulatory capacity. This refocused role would emphasize safety, soundness, and mission oversight, providing a clear check on the GSEs without the intermingling of conservator and regulator responsibilities that has characterized their operation for many years.